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Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Only Mega
Banks Need Apply

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a group of climbers starting a hike on safe terrain led
by an instructor. The terrain then gets progressively rockier and steeper
until the instructor arrives at a nearly vertical cliff. From there, the only
options for each climber are to stop the hike altogether or proceed up a
tall, jagged cliff. The instructor's advice to the climbers wishing to
continue is to use reasonable judgment as to the risks and to buy
expensive safety equipment. The climbers know that others have
attempted to tackle the cliff but have fallen without enough equipment,
suffering grave injuries. Furthermore, today the cliff face has also
become more jagged, and there is a storm approaching.
This analogy represents the present anti-money laundering
(AML) situation between banks and federal regulators. Banks are at the
base of the cliff facing hard decisions. As AML compliance becomes
more difficult, the only guidance given by federal regulators is to make
a reasonable attempt given the risks inherent to each account.' Despite
the increasingly complex financial landscape and minimal guidance, the
disciplinary consequences are grave should a bank's monitoring system
fail. That being said, for a bank that can throw enough money at the
problem to pay for the safety equipment, reaching the top of the cliff is
possible despite the approaching regulatory storm.
In the last decade, federal agencies have increased their
oversight of bank compliance with AML laws.2 While increased federal
1. Due Diligence Programs for Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Financial
Institutions, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.176(b)(1) (2012) ("Conduct enhanced scrutiny of such
correspondent account to guard against money laundering and to identify and report any
suspicious transactions in accordance with applicable law and regulation. This enhanced
scrutiny shall reflect the risk assessment of the account .... ").
2. See STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 108TH CONG., REP.
ON. MONEY LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN CORRUPTION: ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE PATRIOT ACT: CASE STUDY INVOLVING RIGGS BANK 9 (2004) [hereinafter RIGGS BANK

REPORT], available at
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regulation is nothing new in the financial world, the force of AML
regulation is increasing at a faster pace than it has in response to banks'
AML failures in the past.3 Congress has not only been critical of
financial institutions and their compliance efforts, but also of federal
regulators and their oversight.4 Dealing with tighter scrutiny from avid
regulators, banks will be forced to increase costs to adhere to stricter
AML guidelines. 5 "Second tier ' 6 banks will likely struggle with the
costs and red tape of this stricter compliance regime.7 In contrast, the
world's largest banks, with vast financial resources, will have an
opportunity to capitalize on a competitive advantage in providing
8
financial services which require enhanced due diligence.
Following this introduction, Part II of this note will outline the

http://www.levin.senategov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2004/O924psireport.pdf (released in
conjunction with the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Hearing on July 15, 2004,
this report details the AML deficiencies at Riggs Bank).
3. See Press Release, Opening Statement of Sen. Carl Levin: U.S. Vulnerabilities to
Money Laundering, Drugs and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History 5 (July 17, 2012)
[hereinafter Levin Statement] (follow Member Statements, Chairman, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations CARL LEVIN D (MI) "Download Statement (93.9 KB)"
hyperlink) (recommendating harsher penalties for non-compliance, including charter
revocation)_(the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations immediately
released Sen. Levin's opening statement from the hearing as a press release); Greg Farrell,
Deutsche Bank Among Four Said to Be in U.S. Iran Probe, BLOOMBERG (Aug, 18, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-18/deutsche-bank-among-four-said-to-be-in-u-slaundering-probe.html (predicting from insider information that Deutsche Bank and three
other unnamed banks would be the next to join the series of banks already subjected to
investigations).
4.

STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., REP. ON

U.S. VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC
CASE
HISTORY
(2012)
[hereinafter
HSBC
REPORT],
available
at
http ://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/us-vulnerabilities-tomoney-laundering-drugs-and-terrorist-financing-hsbc-case-history (released in conjunction
with the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations' July 17, 2012 hearing, this report
describes oversight from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as ineffective).
5. See Neil Katkov, Trends in Anti-Money Laundering 2011 (2011),
http://amlcft.com/files/2011/09/Celent-AML-Trends-2011-2013-Report.pdf
(last visited
Feb. 5, 2013) (reporting the results of a survey of more than 75 financial institutions
globally as to the current and projected costs of AML compliance).
6. This note focuses on the cost and impact of compliance with AML laws by
comparing those of the world's largest global banks with those of smaller global or
multinational banks. To distinguish the two, this note will use the terms "first tier" and
"second tier."
7. See HSBC's Grilling, What Comes Out in the Wash, ECONOMIST (Jul. 18, 2012,
9:45 PM) [hereinafter, HSBC's Grilling],
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/07/hsbc's-grilling (last visited Feb. 3,
2013).
8. Id.
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development of AML statutes from their inception to the Patriot Act. 9
Part III will detail the inadequate implementation of these laws by
financial institutions and the minimal oversight from regulators in the
past.' 0 Next, Part IV will explore what is now expected of U.S.
chartered banks in today's heightened regulatory regime and the
economies of scale needed for compliance." Finally, Part V concludes
by identifying some of the prospective issues surrounding AML
compliance and by suggesting that without change, the regulatory
regime will have more losers than winners as second tier banks struggle
to remain competitive with industry giants.12
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AML LAWS
A.

Money LaunderingDefined

Federal law defines money laundering as "the movement of
illicit cash or cash equivalent proceeds into, out of, or through the
United States [or] . . . United States financial institutions." 3 The
impetus behind AML laws was a rise in reports of people carrying
"bags full of currency of doubtful origin into banks for deposit" in the
1950s and 1960s. 14 Since then, the banking industry has expanded and
globalized, and AML laws have continually evolved to confront
5
contemporary problems.'
B.

Early AML Legislation

Passed in 1970, the first federal law designed to limit money
laundering was the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra part IV.
See infra part V.
31 U.S.C. § 5340(2) (2006).

14.

Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, HISTORY OF THE BANK

SECRECY ACT (2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-026-005.html#d0e23.
As
opposed to deposits of bags of cash, money laundering has taken a myriad of forms using
complex transactions and various financial instruments.
15. See, e.g., FDIC, See Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering, and Office of
ForeignAssets Control, DSC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, 1

(2004) [hereinafter FDICManual],
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa-aml-infobase/documents/FDICDOCs/BSAManual.pdf.
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and Foreign Transaction Report Act, 16 more commonly known as the

Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The law required banks to keep certain
records and reports in order to aid in "criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against
international terrorism.' 17 These records and reports were intended to
facilitate audits or form a paper trail for law enforcement and regulatory
agencies such that transactions could be reconstructed or retraced when
necessary. 18 As the first AML law of its kind, Title I of the BSA

authorized the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
to issue regulations requiring recordkeeping from financial
institutions.' 9 Title II empowered the Treasury to prescribe the exact

requirements concerning reports of transactions over $10,000.20
The next important piece of AML legislation, following minor
amendments to the BSA, was the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986.21 It imposed criminal liability for violation of money-laundering
regulations,22 but also expanded the reach of AML laws by defining
"transaction" 23 and "financial transaction" 24 as broadly as possible to

cover a wider range of activities. These two provisions put very few, if
any, economic activities outside the purview of AML law. 25 The
16. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006).
17. See id.
18. See FDICManual, supra note 15, at 1.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C) (2006).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (2006) (defining "transaction" to include "a purchase, sale,
loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial
institution includes a deposit, withdrawal transfer between accounts.. .or any other
payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means
effected."). Clearly, transactions subject to AML laws include those that do not involve
financial institutions.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(4) (2006) ("The term 'financial transaction' means (A) a
transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving
the movement of funds by wire or other means, (ii) involving one or more monetary
instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree."). In
United States v. Skinner (946 F.2d 176) (1991), the court upheld convictions for laundering
money even though they resulted from a series of uncomplicated cocaine sales, rather than
traditional bank activity.
25. Congress is almost always purposeful with use of the phrase "affecting commerce"
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Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 formally
increased the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to include
summons powers 26 and the explicit ability to subject "nonfinancial
trades or businesses" to AML laws.27 Taken together, these pieces of
legislation empowered the Treasury to impose criminal liability on a
wider variety of institutions (and individuals) for a broader range of
"transactions."
Between 1986 and 2001, additional legislation increased the
body of AML law, 28 but none had the substantial impact of the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Interpret and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).29 The 9/11
attacks revealed the vulnerability of American financial institutions to
money laundering as investigations later made clear that the terrorists
responsible utilized the U.S. financial system. 30 In the aftermath of the
attacks, Congress included stronger AML laws in the Patriot Act of
2002,31 and federal agencies in turn promulgated stronger regulations
for financial institutions. 32 The twelve portions of the Patriot Act
remain the most important additions to AML law since the enactment of
the BSA in 1970.33
Of the sections affecting financial institutions, Section 312
imposed the most substantial regulatory burden on banks and the
biggest oversight burden on federal agencies.34 It was an amendment to
the BSA that "impos[ed] due diligence and enhanced due diligence

to imply that legislation applies as broadly as the Commerce Clause. See Citizens Bank v.

Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (interpreting the term "involving commerce" in the FAA as
the functional equivalent of "affecting commerce," describing the latter as words of art that
signal the broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (a)(4) (2006).
27. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (a)(2) (2006).
28. See Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2243; Money Laundering Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-310, 112 Stat.
2941.
29. See FDIC, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering,and Office of Foreign Asset
Control, DSC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES 8 (2004),
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa aml-infobase/documents/FDICDOCs/BSAManual.pdf.
30. HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 6 (2012).
31. Id. at 1, n.4 (2012).
32. See, e.g., Due Diligence Programs for Correspondent Accounts for Foreign
Financial Institutions, 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.605; 1010.610; 1010.630; 1010.670 (2012).
33. See generally Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Examination
Manual, supra note 29, at 8.
34. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(2012).
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requirements on U.S. financial institutions that maintain correspondent
accounts for foreign financial institutions or private banking accounts
for non-U.S. persons. 35 As discussed below in the context of the
HSBC example,36 the correspondent accounts37 of greatest concern and
subject to enhanced due diligence are those maintained for banks
operating: (1) under an offshore banking license; 38 (2) under a license
issued by a country that has been designated as being non-cooperative
with international anti-money laundering principles or procedures; 39 or
(3) under a license issued by a country designated by the Secretary of
the Treasury as warranting special measures due to money laundering
concerns. 40 In effect, banks are now required to show that they are
reasonably capable of detecting suspicious activities given the high risk
of money laundering inherent to designated correspondent accounts. 41
III. AML ASSESSMENTS: BANKS AND REGULATORS

Federal agencies are empowered to promulgate procedures for
banks and to oversee the implementation of these procedures.42 Reports
from the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) have
revealed a culture of non-compliance by banks and deficient oversight
by agencies.43 Absent sufficient compliance and meaningful oversight,
a substantial volume of laundered money has been moved through the
35. USA Patriot Act, FinCEN,
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/patriot/index.html?r=1 &id=312#312 (last visited Jan.
23,2013).
36.

See infra Part III.

37. The final rule implementing Section 312 and the Patriot Act itself define
correspondent banking broadly as any account established for a foreign financial institution
"to receive deposits from, or to make payments or other disbursements on behalf of, the
financial institution, or to handle other financial transactions related to such foreign
financial institution." FACT SHEET, Section 312 of the USA PatriotAct, FinalRegulation
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 1-2 (Dec. 2005).

38. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(c)(1)(2012).
39. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(c)(2) (2012).
40. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(c)(3) (2012).
41. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b) (2012). Part IV of this Note details the implementation of
the enhanced due diligence procedures.
42.

See Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering, and Office of Foreign Asset

Control, DSC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, FEDERAL DEPOSIT

INSURANCE CORPORATION 8.1-8 (2004),

http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa-amlinfobase/documents/FDICDOCs/BSAManual.pdf.
43. See HSBC REPORT, supra note 4 (2012).
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U.S. financial system.
A.

Bank ComplianceHistory
1. Riggs Bank

The first high-profile Congressional investigation into AML
compliance following the passage of the Patriot Act began in 2003. 44
Upon the request of Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, the
Subcommittee investigated "the enforcement and effectiveness of key
anti-money laundering provisions in the Patriot Act, using Riggs Bank
as a case study. 4 5 The evidence did not cast a positive light on Riggs
Bank; the investigation revealed a dysfunctional AML program and
blatant disregard for its AML obligations.4 6 Notably, two sets of
troublesome accounts linked Riggs Bank to Augusto Pinochet and
Equatorial Guinea.47
Pinochet, the former president of Chile, maintained personal
accounts at Riggs Banks for at least eight years while under
investigation and subject to a worldwide court order freezing his
assets.48 Riggs Banks not only served as his personal bank, but the

44. RIGGS BANK REPORT, supra note 2, at 1 (2004).
45. Id.
46. Press Release, FinCEN, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Assessment of Civil Money
Penalty 8 (May 13, 2004), availableat
http://www.fincen.gov/news room/ea/files/riggsassessment3.pdf
47. James Rowley, Riggs Bank Fined $16 Mln for Helping Chile's Pinochet (Update
5),

BLOOMBERG,

(March

29,

2005),

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDX6Lhj3.j3l
(last visited
Jan. 15, 2013). Augusto Pinochet Ugarte seized power on September 11, 1973. While his
time in office led to economic growth in Chile, thousands of citizens were executed or
disappeared, and countless others were detained, tortured or exiled. Jonathan Kandell,
Augusto Pinochet, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES,
(December
11,
2006),
.http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/1 1/world/americas/1 lpinochet.html?pagewanted=all (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013). Equatorial Guinea is a small, oil-rich country in central Africa. The
ruling elite has amassed a litany of human rights violations spanning fifty years under
Francisco Macias Ngeuma and his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema. The totalitarian
reality of life for the 700,000 citizens was "stolen elections, strict censorship, routine
torture, and murdered dissidents." Thor Halvorssen and Tutu Alicante, How Dictators
Triumph: With a Little Help From Their Friends,THE HUFFINGTON POST (August 6, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thor-halvorssen/how-dictators-triumphwit b 1789668.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
48. Terencce O'Hara & Kathleen Day, Riggs Bank Hid Assets of Pinochet, Report
Says, WASHINGTON POST (July 15, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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relationship began because senior officials at Riggs actively pursued
Pinochet's business. 49 The report alleges that the bank conducted
transactions in violation of AML laws for many years, including
deposits of money from unknown origins, the creation of offshore shell
corporations, efforts to hide Pinochet's involvement 50in cash
transactions, and personal deliveries of cashier checks to Chile.
Riggs carried on a similar relationship with Equatorial Guinea,
its officials, and their family members for whom the bank managed
more than 60 accounts and certificates of deposits. 5' While Pinochet's
total deposits varied between $4 and $8 million at a time, Equatorial
Guinean officials and their families maintained balances and
outstanding loans approaching $700 million, representing the bank's
largest single relationship.5 2 The bank turned a blind eye to the
unknown origins of millions of dollars in deposits, and set up shell
corporations as a means of covering up beneficial ownership, among
other things. 53 The Congressional report concluded that "the evidence
demonstrates that the Pinochet and Equatorial Guinea accounts were not
treated in an unusual manner but were the product of a dysfunctional
54
AML program with long-standing, major deficiencies.
2. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC-US)
In comparison, HSBC-US exhibited longstanding AML
deficiencies through various, more clandestine financial vehicles,
ranging from the transfer in bulk of travelers checks and cash to bearer
share accounts and high-risk affiliate accounts.5 5 More specifically,

dyn/articles/A50222-2004Jul 14.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
49. Rowley, supra note 47.

50. RIGGS BANK REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. The bank changed the name on the
accounts from "Augusto Pinochet Ugarte & Lucia Hiriart de Pinochet" to "L. Hiriat &/or A.
Ugarte" to make sure the name Pinochet would not be found if searched. Timothy L.
O'Brien, At Riggs Bank, A Tangled Path Led To Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, (July 19, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/19/us/at-riggs-bank-a-tangled-path-led-toscandal.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
51. O'Brien, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Terence O'Hara, Riggs Bank Agrees to Guilty Plea andFine, WASHINGTON POST
(January 28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A415842005Jan27.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
54.

RIGGS BANK REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.

55.

See HSBC REPORT, supra note 4. HSBC-US provided millions of dollars per year
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HSBC's group-wide policy regarding its global affiliates was
systematically at odds with AML laws in that it failed to follow
enhanced due diligence requirements pursuant to the BSA and Section
312.56 These procedures include: (1) verification of the identity of the
nominal and beneficial owners of an account; (2) documentation
showing the sources of funds; and (3) enhanced scrutiny of accounts
and transactions of senior foreign political figures. 7
HSBC-US, as the U.S. affiliate to HSBC, operated
correspondent accounts for approximately eighty HSBC affiliates
around the world.5 8 These, like other correspondent accounts, provided
access to the U.S. financial system to respondent banks located in highrisk jurisdictions and/or to those that provided services to high-risk
clients.5 9 The obvious defect in HSBC group policy was its assumption
that any affiliate owned fifty percent or more by the group met federal
AML standards. Thus, to HSBC-US this relieved the burden to conduct
60
any due diligence as to the affiliate's AML compliance program.
HSBC-US treated its own affiliates in high-risk jurisdictions as it would
treat the bank next door instead of using stricter scrutiny as it should
when dealing with unaffiliated high-risk banks. 6 1 This HSBC group
policy disregarded even ordinary due diligence standards that must be
met when opening a correspondent account with any financial

to a Japanese bank by cashing travelers' checks.

Bulk cash transfers were a part of the

HBMX money-laundering scheme and ultimately allowed HBMX to smuggle the more
physical U.S. dollars to HSBC-US than any of its 80 affiliates. Over the course of a decade,
HSBC-US allowed more than 2,000 customers to open bearer share accounts; these are high
risk accounts in that ownership is assigned to whomever has physical possession of the
shares, allowing secrecy as to the true beneficial owner. The HSBC-US office in Miami had
over 1,600 bearer share accounts at its peak, while there were over 850 at HSBC-US New
York. Id. at 277. This note uses HSBC-US instead of HBUS in hopes of avoiding
confusion.
56. See News Release, OCC, OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty
Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-

releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
57. See FDIC, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering, and Office of ForeignAsset
Control, DSC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES 30 (2004),

http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa-aml infobase/documents/FDICDOCs/BSAManual.pdf.
58.

HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 21.

59. Levin Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
60.

HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 35; see also HSBC's Grilling, supra note 7.

Ownership of the affiliate was no guarantee of AML compliance.
61.

See HSBC's Grilling, supra note 7 ("The senator noted that the bank continued to

operate in jurisdictions with secrecy laws; he asked whether it could ignore those limitations
to meet America's transparency demands.").

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 17

institution (much less one in a high-risk country)62 by creating an
exception for foreign affiliates not recognized by law.
Correspondent accounts have been identified for over a decade
as a banking mechanism susceptible to manipulation by foreign banks
in order to launder money. 63 The relationship between HSBC-US and
HSBC Mexico S.A. Banco (HBMX) "illustrates how providing a
correspondent account and U.S. dollar services to a high-risk affiliate
increase[s] AML risks." 64 HSBC group purchased a Mexican bank
called Bital in 2002, creating HBMX; Bilal had no functional AML
compliance program at the time despite widespread drug trafficking and
money laundering in Mexico. 65 Consistent with HSBC policy, HSBCUS treated HBMX as a low-risk affiliate, despite its operations in 66a
high-risk jurisdiction without an AML compliance program.
Unsurprisingly, the PSI investigation revealed that HBMX opened
accounts for high-risk clients, including criminal currency exchange
businesses and suspect corporations.67
3. Other Prosecutions and Legal Actions
AML compliance was not a problem limited to Riggs Bank and
HSBC, as evidenced by the number of investigations 68 into large banks
operating in the U.S. In 2010, the government filed a deferred
prosecution agreement against Wachovia Bank, N.A. after discovering
that Mexican casa de cambios had moved at least $110 million in drug
proceeds through the bank.69 Wachovia paid $160 million in civil and
62.
63.

HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.
See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-156, 15 Stat. 272, 296 (2001).

64.

HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.

65.
66.

Id.
HSBC Money LaunderingReport: Key Findings, BBC NEWS (December 11, 2012),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18880269.
67.

HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 35. The currency exchange businesses in Mexico

are referred to as casa de cambios, used by criminals to launder funds by exchanging U.S.
dollars or Mexican pesos prior to their being transmitted to an international account. Illegal
Casa De Cambio Launders More Than $5 Million, THE SAR ACIVITY REVIEW 3 (2001),

http://www.fincen.gov/law-enforcement/ss/pdf/032.pdf. The corporations of concern were
later proven to be shell corporations used to launder funds from illegal drug sales in the
United States. HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.
68. Farrell, supra note 3.
69. Curt Anderson, Wachovia To Settle Money Laundering Case for $160 Million,
PM),
6:23
2010,
17,
(March
POST
HUFFINGTON

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/17/wachovia-to-settle-money-_n_502959.html.
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criminal fines and promised to undertake significant AML reforms to
avoid prosecution.7 ° In December of 2012, Standard Chartered, PLC,
pledged to pay over $650 million in penalties.7 1 Insiders involved in the
Standard Chartered case have suggested that regulators will likely soon
turn their attention to a new set of banks thought to be in violation of
73
AML laws. 72 Taken together, these and numerous other examples
highlight failed compliance from large banks in the last decade despite
the AML provisions in the Patriot Act.
Smaller banks have run afoul of AML laws, sometimes leading
to lost charters or their exit from the correspondent banking market.74
Zions First National Bank, headquarted in Salt Lake City, UT, wound
down its foreign correspondent business as the cost of compliance
technology increased beyond its budget.7 5 In November of 2012, First
Bank of Delaware lost its charter (the so-called "Death Penalty") 76 for
its AML failures.77 On top of the charter revocation, the bank paid a $15
million civil penalty; the deficiencies included failure "to adequately
oversee third-party payment processor relationships and related
products and services in a manner commensurate with associated
risks., 78 The examples of Zions First National Bank and the First Bank

70.

Press Release, U.S. Att'y's Off. for the S. Dist. of Fla., Wachovia Enters into

Deferred
Prosecution
Agreement
(Mar.
17,
2010)
(available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/ PressReleases/100317-02.html); Anderson, supra note 69.
71. Too Big to Jail, ECONOMIST, December 15, 2012, [hereinafter Too Big to Jail]

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21568403-two-big-british-banksreach-controversial-settlements-too-big-jail?fsrc=scn/tw/te/pe/toobigtoojail.
72. See Farrell, supra note 3.
73.
74.

See Too Big to Jail, supra note 71.
BSA/IAML
Penalty
List,

CitiBank,

N.A.,

http://www.bankersonline.con/security/bsapenaltylist.html#citibankna

BANKERSONLINECOM,

(last visited Jan. 21,

2013).
75. Samuel Rubenfeld, FinCEN,OCC Fine Zions FirstBank $8 Million for Inadequate
AML Compliance, CORRUPTION CURRENTS, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Feb. 11, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/02/1 1/fincen-occ-fine-utah-bank-8-million-

for-inadequate-aml-compliance/ ("Zions exited the business in 2008 and reported the
suspicious activity connected to it, the OCC said in its statement"). Zions attempted to
market a deposit service to high-risk foreign customers, but failed to implement an effective
AML safeguard or file timely suspicious activity reports therefrom. BSA/AML Penalty List,
Citibank, N.A., supra note 74.
76. BSA/AML Penalty List, CitiBank, N.A., supra note 74. The Delaware Office of

State Bank Commissioner terminated the bank's charter and the FDIC terminated its deposit
insurance.
77. Samuel Rubenfeld, First Bank of Delaware Loses Charter Over AML Problems,
Wall St. J. Blogs: Corruption Currents,WALL ST. J. (November 19, 2012 3:23 PM).
78. BSA/AML Penalty List, CitiBank,N.A., supra note 74.
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of Delaware represent the departure of regional and small national
banks from the foreign correspondent banking market, a fate that may
soon face smaller multinational banks.
B.

Oversightfrom the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

1. Organization and Strategies
Banks' widespread failure in AML compliance would not have
been possible without ineffective oversight from regulators. 79 The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the federal agency
responsible for oversight of banks and savings associations with
80
national charters, and certain U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned banks.
State chartered non-member banks and state chartered member banks
are regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Federal Reserve Bank respectively.8 '
When large banks are under investigation, the relevant OCC
office assigns an Examiner-in-Charge (EIC) and a team of examiners to
work full-time on site at a particular bank.82 The EIC is assigned to a
specific bank for a five-year term, while the other examiners are
assigned to a specific bank for any period of time. 83 Large banks are
placed on an annual examination cycle, 84 and the EIC and his team use a
variety of examination procedures set forth in the Federal Financial
79. HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 283. The PSI report claims that the OCC
examination system has tolerated "severe AML deficiencies."
80. Id. at 287. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) previously supervised federal
savings associations and institutions, but it was abolished by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The OCC assumed all of the OTS's duties on July
21, 2011. Id. at 287, n.1727. With a budget of $875 million in 2011, the OCC oversees
about 2,000 nationally chartered banks and about 50 U.S. affiliates of foreign owned banks.
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the OCC employs 3,700 workers in 66 offices
nationwide and divides its offices into four districts known as the Northeastern, Central,
Southern, and Western districts. Each of the districts is assigned with oversight of banks in
its respective region. OCC, 2011 Annual Fiscal Report (2011) [hereinafter OCC Annual
Report]
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/annualreports/2011AnnualReport.pdf (located under chart entitled "OCC at-a-Glance") (last
visited Feb. 1, 2013); HSBC Report, supra note 4, at 293-294.
81. Banking
Regulators,
U.S.
SEC.
AND
EXCH.
COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/bankreg.htm (last updated Jan. 13, 2012). The member/nonmember distinction refers to membership in the Federal Reserve System.
82. HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 294.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 5.
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Institutions Examination Council's Interagency BSA/AML Examination
Manual 85 and/or the Comptroller Handbook for Large Bank
Supervision.86
The supervisory and enforcement process begins with a
Supervisory Letter to the bank's senior management and board of
directors documenting the OCC's findings and conclusions as to the
AML problems identified in the bank.87 The Supervisory letter includes
a section called "Matters Requiring Attention" (MRA); "MRAs are a
serious consequence of the examination," and once "identified and
communicated to the banks, the bank's senior management and board of
directors are required to promptly correct them within the agreed upon
time frame." 88 MRAs for large banks are continually updated and
tracked in an OCC data system used only for large banks, and
examiners issue reports on a quarterly basis. 89 In addition, the EIC is
required to draft an annual supervisory strategy based on perceived risks
and subject to the approval of the deputy comptroller for Large Bank
Supervision at OCC headquarters.9" When deficiencies amount to a
violation of minimum AML compliance procedures, 9' the agency can
issue a cease and desist order (C&D order) and begin legal proceedings
when necessary.92

85. In an effort to improve supervision, federal banking agencies finalized an
interagency manual that provides consistent examination procedures for BSA/AML and
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations. See Press Release, Testimony of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. And Governmental Affairs of the U.S.
Senate" 3-5 (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter OCC Testimony] (including graphic aids and
dividing the OCC testimony into well organized sections and subsections) (available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/us-vulnerabilities-tomoney-laundering-drugs-and-terrorist-financing-hsbc-case-history)
(follow
Witnesses,
Panel 4, The Honorable Thomas J. Curry, "Download Tesimony (117 KB)" hyperlink).
86. See generally COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
LARGE BANK SUPERVISION (2010) [hereinafter LARGE BANK SUPERVISION], available at

http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/lbs.pdf
(outlining the procedure for large bank supervision).
87. OCC Testimony, supra note 85, at 7.
88. Id.
89.

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 86, at 15-

17.
90. Id.
91. 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2012).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) (2006).
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2. The OCC's Poor Performance
Despite the seemingly well-tailored procedures in place for
AML oversight, the OCC has consistently failed to institute adequate
enforcement actions. 93 In his opening statement for the HSBC hearing,
Senator Levin expressed disapproval by saying that any risks to the U.S.
financial system is troubling but even more so when "there is a failure
of AML oversight by the OCC which is supposed to oversee our biggest
banks. 94 The record indicates that the OCC is often effective in
identifying AML problems, but lax in enforcement of its
recommendations and in imposing penalties.95 Senators Levin and Tom
Coburn went so far as to call the OCC "an ineffectual industry lapdog,"
serving only mild sanctions in exchange for empty promises to do
better.96

Based on prior poor performance, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs (the Committee) issued enforcement
recommendations for the OCC. 97 The Committee was critical of the
OCC for "not citing violations of the individual AML program
components, instead treating any such deficiency as a Matter Requiring
Attention (MRA) by the bank," 98 reserving harsh citations only for
violations of the pillars99 and not lesser components.

The Committee

93. Levin Statement, supra note 3, at 6.
94. Id.
95. See Brett Wolf, U.S. Bank Regulator Promises Better Enforcement Following
Scathing Congressional Report into HSBC AML Failures, REUTERS FINANCIAL
REGULATORY FORUM (July 18, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-

forum/2012/07/18/u-s-bank-regulator-promises-better-enforcement-following-scathingcongressional-report-into-hsbc-aml-failures/ ("[Senator] Levin said: 'This is not a case
where OCC examiners failed to do their jobs. The higher-ups were overly passive, waiting
until the problem grew into a very huge one before taking any action."').
96. HSBC's Grilling,supra note 7.
97. Levin Statement, supra note 3, at 6.
98.

HSBC REPORT, supra note 4, at 322.

99. The Bank Secrecy Act lists four minimum requirements sometimes referred to as
the "pillars" of an effective AML program. They are (1) internal controls to ensure ongoing
compliance, (2) a designated individual responsible for managing AML compliance, (3)
AML training for appropriate personnel, and (4) independent testing of AML compliance.
Internal controls at a large bank "would include Know-Your-Customer (KYC) policies and
procedures, including developing a customer identification program, conducting due
diligence reviews, and assessing customer risk; a monitoring system to analyze account and
wire transfer activity to detect suspicious activity, and a system for reporting suspicious
activity to law enforcement." The designated individual is a bank's AML compliance
officer who must be knowledgeable about the law and have the expertise and authority to
ensure compliance. The third requirement is training for all personnel with AML
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argued that while MRAs do require corrective action from the bank,
they don't carry the same weight as violations of law because MRAs are
not enforceable in court and may "mislead[] a bank about the
seriousness of an AML deficiency, delay remedial action, and allow an
AML problem to fester."' 100 Therefore, if examiners only assign MRAs
to narrow issues, banks can get away with addressing just these narrow
problems instead of the broader deficiency underlying the entire
01
pillar.'
3. OCC's Policy Changes
While there is no guarantee that the OCC will follow the
Committee's suggestion to issue more violations of law and C&D
orders (and fewer MRAs), 10 2 the OCC has outlined some of its newly
enacted and proposed policies. 103 Underlying this entire conversation is
the OCC's commitment to increasing its presence and oversight 10 4 given
its shortcomings in the past. Between 2005 and 2011, the OCC issued
more BSA focused C&D orders and civil money penalties (CMP)
against banks than the FDIC and the Federal Reserve combined as a
ratio of banks supervised. 0 5 The OCC has also imposed the largest
dollar amount in penalties in CMPs related to AML- $124 million
compared to penalties of $25 million and $50 million by the FDIC and
06
Federal Reserve respectively.'
The OCC has identified certain activities or areas as warranting
additional attention in the near future.' 0 7 To address these issues, the
OCC plans to implement changes to the Large Bank Review Team to
improve the "ability to bring different perspectives to bear and react on

responsibilities, including the need to be up-to-date with the law. Finally, the last pillar is
independent testing, which is normally performed by a bank's internal audit group or by an
outside auditor with AML expertise. HSBC Report, supra note 4, at 286-87.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Levin Statement, supra note 3, at 6 (Curry said the OCC would also seek to
provide moreflexibility in citing BSA violations) (emphasis added); Wolf, supra note 95.
103. OCC Annual Report, supra note 80, at 13.
104. See Wolf, supra note 95 ("The agency was much too slow in responding and
addressing what are significant weaknesses or violations at this institution.").
105. OCC Testimony, supra note 85, at 10.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 13.
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a more timely basis" to MRAs or apparent AML failures. 0 8 The OCC's
new policies are purportedly more risk-based, rather than rule-based,
and focused on accountability for senior managers and board
members. 10 9 Finally, the OCC stressed the need for constant evolution
of compliance programs to deal with new methods used by money
launderers and terrorist financiers.' °
IV.THE REALITIES OF

A.

THE NEW AML COMPLIANCE REGIME FOR BANKS

Implementation of EnhancedDue Diligence

While Congress passes AML laws, it is up to the agencies to set
standards and concrete rules for banks to implement."' The
implementing statute for Section 312 of the Patriot Act"12 outlines due
diligence procedures for all foreign correspondent accounts and
enhanced due diligence procedures for correspondent accounts fitting
the criteria mentioned above."13 Compliance with enhanced due
diligence requires a covered financial institution" 4 to establish
procedures that, at a minimum, include taking "reasonable" steps in
three important areas." 5
108. Wolf, supra note 95. Curry also pledged "changes to our LB Review Team process
to make it more effective in supporting and ensuring consistency of the supervisory
processes for the larger banks we supervise." OCC Testimony, supra note 85, at 13.
109. Michael A. Dawson, Anti-Money-Laundering Enforcement Gets Tougher and
4:00
PM),
Smarter,
AM.
BANKER
BANKTHINK
(July
26,
2012,
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/anti-money-laundering-enforcement-getstougher-smarter- 1051310-1.html.
110. OCC Testimony, supra note 85, at 12-13.
111. 12U.S.C.§1818(s)(2006).
112. FinCEN; Anti-Money Laundering Programs; Special Due Diligence Programs for
Certain Foreign Accounts, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,768 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 103) (approving final rules after notice and comment and since codified as planned and
included into the most recent C.F.R. pursuant 75 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 26, 2010)).
113. See supra at Part II.
114. "Covered" financial institutions are those that are affected by the correspondent
banking portion of Section 312. The following U.S. financial institutions are covered by the
correspondent banking provisions of the final rule: (1) banking institutions; (2) securities
broker-dealers, (3) futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities;
and (4) mutual funds. See Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Financial Institutions, 67
Fed. Reg. 21,110 (Apr. 29, 2002) (to be codified 31 C.F.R. pt. 103); Anti-Money
Laundering Program for Mutual Funds, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,117 (Apr. 29, 2002) (to be codified
31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
115. Due Diligence Programs for Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Financial
Institutions, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610 (2012).
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First, enhanced due diligence requires banks to treat
correspondent accounts, established or maintained for respondent banks,
11 6
with elevated scrutiny based upon the risk presented by the account.
In practice, this elevated scrutiny means obtaining information about the
AML program, 17 monitoring individual
respondent banks'
transactions,' 18 and obtaining the identity of any person with authority
to direct transactions or the source and owner of funds placed in the
account. 119

Second, a covered bank must determine whether the respondent
bank provides access to its covered U.S. accounts for other foreign
banks through its own correspondent accounts. 120 If so, the covered
bank must take steps, as appropriate, to assess and mitigate the risks of
1 21
money laundering presented by the third party financial institution.
The implementing statute simply suggests finding out the name of the
third party bank; but given the first requirement, it follows that once the
third party bank is identified, it becomes necessary to assess that bank's
AML program as well.
Third, banks are required to determine the identity of each
owner of a respondent bank whose shares are not publicly traded and
ascertain the nature and extent of each owner's interest. 22 Owners are
defined as those who directly or indirectly own, control, or have the
power to vote 10 percent or more of any class of securities for a foreign
bank. 123
116. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b)(1) (2012) ("Conduct enhanced scrutiny of such
correspondent account to guard against money laundering and to identify and report any
suspicious transactions in accordance with applicable law and regulation. This enhanced
scrutiny shall reflect the risk assessment of the account False").
117. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b)(1)(i) (2012). The final rule demands that banks obtain
and consider "information" relating to a respondent bank's AML program in order to assess
the risk of money laundering. This language replaced the requirement in the Second
Proposed Rule that obliged banks to obtain and review "documentation" relating to a
respondent's AML program and to "consider whether such program appears to be
reasonably designed to detect and prevent money laundering." FinCEN; Anti-Money
Laundering Programs; Special Due Diligence Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts, 72
Fed. Reg. at 44769.
118. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b)(1)(ii) (2012).
119. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b)(l)(iii) (2012).
120. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b)(2) (2012).
121. Id.
122. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b)(3) (2012). "Publicly traded" means shares that are traded
on an exchange or an organized over-the-counter market that is regulated by a foreign
securities authority as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
123. Id.
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The Treasury believes that because these requirements are riskbased rather than a default or mandatory requirement, banks won't be
forced to inspect every respondent bank with a covered correspondent
account.124 Rather, the extent to which a reasonable inquiry into the
AML program of a respondent bank is needed will depend upon the
nature of the correspondent account. 125 Thus, the Treasury claims there
is some flexibility and discretion afforded banks in the exercise of this
1 26
risk-based analysis sufficient to reduce the financial burden.
However, it seems that the attempt to afford discretion by way of a
reasonableness standard has had and will continue to have the opposite
effect.
The logic of increased flexibility and a lesser burden is at odds
with the cautionary tale of HSBC and the numerous banks subjected to
penalties in the last eight years. The evidence is not the rise in AML
prosecutions and violations, but the increase in costs due to uncertainty
27
as to how to avoid being the next bank to fall under investigation.1
Without any clear benchmarks or concrete guidance upon which to
make a discretionary decision, banks are stuck in limbo.' 28 In short,
these standards "do not describe with any precision at which point on
the risk continuum financial institutions should identify suspicious
transactions."' 29 It seems that the only reasonable course of action so
far is to increase the AML budget and "hunt mice with cannons" to
124. FinCEN; Anti-Money Laundering Programs; Special Due Diligence Programs for
Certain Foreign Accounts, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,768, 44769 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 103).
125.

Id.

126. Id. ("While covered financial institutions have discretion with respect to
implementing this provision, as with other risk-based provisions of the BSA and its
implementing regulations, a covered financial institution is responsible for reasonably
demonstrating that it is effectively exercising that discretion on a risk-assessed basis.)"
127. Katkov, supra note 5, at 4.
128. Richard K. Gordon, U.S. Government Efforts to Suppress Terrorism Financing:
Trysts or Terrorists? FinancialInstitutions and the Searchfor Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST

L. REv. 699, 724 (2008).
129. Id. The wording of the recommendations themselves includes a number of terms
that are not easily defined in practice and therefore add significantly to the problem. For
example, what are "reasonable measures" when it comes to identifying a beneficial
owner/controller? How detailed must a "risk profile" be, and when will it be "necessary" to
identify the source of funds? With respect to politically exposed persons, what are
"reasonable measures" to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and what
constitutes "enhanced" monitoring? What does it mean to examine "as far as possible" the
"background" and "purpose" of unusual transactions? Again, there is little help in the
FFIEC Manual. Id. at 725.
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appear thorough.13
The counterargument is that previous transgressors have had
grossly deficient AML programs and the OCC has been ineffectual, so
the new standard should not be a burden for reasonably diligent
banks. 13 1 While there is some truth to that argument, it fails after
consideration of compliance trends, technology, and competitive
132
advantage in the banking industry as described below.
B.

The FinancialIndustry's Response

Before issuing the final rules regarding implementation of
Section 312 of the Patriot Act, the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) 3 3 and the Treasury issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking and welcomed comments.1 34 Despite their initial support of
a risk-based system, commenters were generally alarmed about the
breadth and likely costs of Section 312's new requirements. 13 5 For
example, commenters questioned how a covered institution might
adequately assess the risks associated with a foreign respondent bank
136
without costly research or a broad audit into its AML program.

130. Andrew Kahr, Let's Invite HSBC to Leave U.S., AM. BANKER BANKTHINK (July 30,
2012, 9:44 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/say-good-riddance-to-hsbc1051398-1 .html#comments.
131. See Michael A. Dawson, Anti-Money-Laundering Enforcement Gets Tougher and
Smarter,
AM.
BANKER
BANKTHINK
(July
26,
2012,
4:00
PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/anti-money-laundering-enforcement-getstougher-smarter- 1051310-1 .html; FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering Programs, Special Due
Diligence Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,768, 44773 (Aug. 9,
2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
132. See infra Part IV(C)
133. Created in 1990, FinCEN has the power to exercise regulatory power to fulfill its
responsibilities toward the detection and deterrence of financial crime. FinCEN is a bureau
of the Treasury whose mission it is to facilitate the detection and deterrence of financial
crime. Notably, Congress has delegated to FinCen the power to issue and interpret
regulations authorized by statute. As the main network used to combat financial crime,
FinCEN connects and works with federal, state, and local authorities. In its own words, the
"basic concept underlying FinCEN's core activities is 'follow the money,"' referring to the
financial trails left by criminals as they try to launder the proceeds of crimes or spend their
illegally earned profits. What We Do, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/about-fincen/wwd/
(last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
134. Due Diligence Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts, 67
Fed. Reg. 37,736 (May 30, 2002) (First Proposed Rule).
135. Due Diligence Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts, 72
Fed. Reg. 44,770.
136. Id.
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Further, even if this information were attainable at whatever costs, it is
likely that the bank's own records and reports from foreign agencies
37
would be written in the respondent bank's native language.'
Additionally, there was uncertainty as to how banks may obtain
ownership information for securities that are not publicly traded or are
not located in countries whose domestic laws do not require full
38
disclosure of stockholder identity.
Financial giant VISA and national banks of all sizes,
represented by the American Bankers Association (ABA), have spoken
out against other proposed AML laws. 139 The ABA released a
statement in opposition to a proposal for a cross-border electronic funds
transfer reporting system, citing concerns about the cost of
compliance. 140 It contends that the prospective mandates will cause
substantial cost barriers "for changing systems[,] including the virtually
prohibitive expenses in adding information elements to existing
transaction information flows."' 14 1 In response to the same proposal,
Visa encouraged FinCEN to develop reasonable standards necessary to
support law enforcement agencies while considering the possibility that
the rules as stated would unduly burden the legitimate operations of
' 142
financial institutions."

137.
138.

Id.
Id.

139. FinCEN Industry Survey and Responses, 10, 28 (March 21, 2006),
http://www.fincen.gov/newsjroomi/rp/files/Appendix-G.pdf ("[Mlandating a new reporting
regime for CBET would impose substantial new compliance costs on financial institutions
subject to the new rule far out of proportion with the law enforcement utility achieved.")
(discussing the feasibility of a mandatory cross-border electric transfer (CBET) reporting
system, not enhanced due diligence).
140. Id. at 10. ("[M]andating a new reporting regime for CBET would impose
substantial new compliance costs on financial institutions subject to the new rule far out of
proportion with the law enforcement utility achieved."). Id. at 5.
141.

Id. at 10.

142. Id. at 28. VISA's biggest concern was maintaining an exemption for certain kinds
of transactions, including debit, point of sale, and ATM transactions. VISA conducts as
many as 5,000 such transactions per second, so the inclusion of such in the CBET
requirements would tremendously increase VISA's monitoring requirements.
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Compliance Trends and the Creation of a DominatePosition in
Foreign CorrespondentBanking
1. The Costly Process of Compliance

Global AML spending has risen substantially in response to
tougher requirements from regulators. 143 A report published in 2011
estimated that the overall compliance burden would increase costs by
7.8% annually (reaching a total of $5.8 billion by 20 13),144 and that the
software market alone will reach $690 million in 2015.145 The threat of
increased regulation fully materialized in 2012, causing HSBC (and
likely other larger banks facing penalties or investigations) to increase
their AML budgets by far more than 7.8 percent. 146 The size and budget
of AML compliance departments varies by bank depending upon its
finances and business judgment, but there are fairly discernible patterns
in terms of spending depending upon the size of the financial institution
as shown in the following graph. 147
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143. Cornelius Hurley & John A. Beccia, III, The Compliance Function in Diversified
Financial Institutions: Harmonizing the Regulatory Environment for FinancialServices
Firms
24
(2007),
available
at

http://www.fsround.org/publications/pdfs/ComplianceFunctioninDiversifiedFinanciallnstitut
ions.pdf (recommending strategies to improve the effectiveness of compliance function
within diversified financial service institutions)."
144. Katkov, supra note 5, at 4.
145. Julie Conroy McNelley, Global Anti-Money Laundering Vendor Evaluation: A
Reinvigorated
Market
4
(2011),
https://www.sas.com/news/analysts/69575 AiteGlobalAML.pdf.
146. See HSBC's Grilling,supra note 7.
147. Katkov, supra note 5, at 6.
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Clearly, ongoing monitoring requires the greatest proportion of
spending for banks of all sizes, but it is particularly high in second tier
banks. 4 8 This spending trend reflects the high transaction volume of
banks this size, especially compared to the biggest banks which handle
high-value accounts. 149 These high-value accounts warrant increased
customer due diligence (CDD), a set of procedures with a greater need
for technology than ongoing transaction monitoring which "has
traditionally been a process of investigating past activity for suspicious
behavior."'' 50 Smaller institutions should look for solutions that are cost
effective;' 5' thus, given the greater need for ongoing monitoring (less
technology) then customer due diligence, 152 and the potential for high
fees with the software,' 53 there is an opportunity cost for technology
spending. Banks at the very top end of the spectrum do not spend a
considerable percentage more on technology, 54 but what they do spend,
they can recoup by increased efficiency in customer due diligence.
In order to satisfy regulators banks have pursued centralization
and standardization of AML operations 55 and the integration of AML
and anti-fraud programs. 156
Should a single bank achieve this
standardized, centralized, and integrated AML program, it would be the
model of the industry.' 57 The question becomes whether the costs of
replacing the legacy anti-fraud system and adding anti-fraud
functionality, if needed, would produce sufficient incremental gains to
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 11
Id.
Id. atll, 23.
McNelley, supra note 145, at 19.

152.

Katkov, supra note 5, at 11.

153.

McNelley, supra note 145, at 8.

Pricing for AML software solutions typically

consists of an annual license fee and an annual maintenance fee. "Annual license fees are
usually based on an institution's asset size, transaction volume, number of customer
accounts, number of business lines using the solution, or a combination of these factors."
The cost of a license fee can range from $40,000 to $1.5 million. Economies of scale can be
realized. The annual maintenance fee can be anywhere between 15 percent and 30 percent
of the annual licensing fee.
154.
155.

See Katkov, supra note 5, at 12
Chris Belthoff, Effective AML Demands Centralization, AM. BANKER (June 1,

2008), http://www.americanbanker.comlbtn/21_6/-354042-I.html..
156.

157.
Grail).

McNelley, supra note 145, at 15.

Katkov, supra note 5, at 27 (describing integrated AML and anti-fraud as the Holy
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make the system profitable.1 58 In reality, the vast majority of banks
have to take a more affordable siloed or "best-of-breed approach"
conducive to their business models, thus "reduc[ing] the opportunity to
realize efficiencies through implementation of one (or at least fewer)
59
standardized platform.
One option used to centralize and standardize compliance is the
"AML suite," a potentially end-to-end or all-inclusive AML software
program. 160 The software market has become crowded with AML
vendors, and their product lines have expanded to include AML
suites.' 6' For large banks, an AML suite affords the opportunity to
create a uniform, enterprise-wide platform for all pillars of
compliance.' 62 Total consolidation remains difficult given the different
needs within a large financial services institution and different
regulatory demands in various jurisdictions, but "multinational banks
such as Citi, HSBC and Standard Chartered have been working to
standardize AML technology across the dozens of countries in which
163
they operate."'
Another option being pursued is the integration of AML and
anti-fraud measures into a joint technology program. 164 With ever
increasing compliance requirements, banks are looking for ways to
leverage their investment in AML systems and operations to include
anti-fraud protection.165 The benefits of anti-fraud help offset the cost
of AML in that it is a "business activity that generates a direct benefit to

158. Id. at 29-30. Even a ten percent improvement in fraud reduction could be effective,
but that must be weighed against the "cost of ripping out existing solutions [which] can be
prohibitive" and the cost of "additional functionality, such as real-time transaction
monitoring and additional data feeds."
159. Id. at 30.
160. Katkov, supra note 5, at 14, 19, 23; Rajesh Menon & Sanjaya Kumar,
Understandingthe Role of Technology in Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: A Strategic
Model for FinancialInstitutions 4 (Jan. 2005), http://www.infosys.com/industries/financial-

(describing the
services/white-papers/Documents/anti-money-laundering-compliance.pdf
product as a "second general of AML technology," those including the "four basic risk
assessment components that ensure full disclosure and reporting necessary for compliance
with the federal statutes.").
161.

McNelley, supra note 145, at 4.

162. Menon & Kumar, supra note 160, at 4 (describing second generation AML
solutions and how they improve on the shortcomings of previous technology).
163. Katkov, supra note 5, at 27.
164.

Id.

165. Id. Smaller banks and even credit unions have followed the model and combined
anti-fraud and AML.
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a firm's bottom line by reducing financial losses due to fraud."' 6 6 This
option has another benefit: AML software outperforms existing antifraud systems.' 67 Further, the underlying twin aims of AML and antifraud have revealed suspicious patterns that otherwise would have
remained hidden had they not been investigated using a joint technology
68
program. 1
2. Who Is Left Standing
Compliance with enhanced due diligence is predisposed to
economies of scale.' 69 "Depending on where one sits in the compliance
value chain, the cycle of ever more stringent regulatory demands
generating a need for ever more efficient AML operations may appear
virtuous or vicious.' 170 Large compliance departments with large
budgets have the manpower and resources needed to generate piles of
(potentially unnecessary)' 7' reports on transactions and high-risk
correspondent accounts.

172

Commentators claim that HSBC has seemingly bought its way
out of trouble by paying its fine and taking a slap on the wrist.'73 This
has "amplif[ied] growls about regulations which burden and
disadvantage small institutions and businesses, and consumers but from
which the giants remain immune."''

74

The burden to smaller banks is

ultimately passed on to consumers through delays, red tape, and
increased costs. 175 The scenarios are fairly predictable. Transaction
166. Katkov, supra note 5, at 28 (reporting the results of a survey of more than 75
financial institutions globally as to the current and projected costs of AML compliance).
167. Katkov, supra note 5, at 29.
168. John Adams, Post-HSBC, Banks Rethink Anti-Laundering Tech, AM. BANKER
(July 31, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177 147/post-hsbcbanks-rethink-anti-money-laundering-tech- 1051470-1 .html.
169. Katkov, supra note 5, at 6; Hurley & Beccia, supra note 143, at 25.
170. Katkov, supra note 5, at 15.
171. False positives are transactions over a set limit that are marked as suspicious but
that do not represent any existing identified risk to the institution, like securing a mortgage.
The problem with false positives is that they distract a financial institution from other
transactions that can represent a true money laundering risk. Menon & Kumar, supra note
160, at 3.
172. Kahr, supra note 130.
173. See id.; Too Big to Jail, supra note 71 (characterizing the penalties of HSBC and
Standard Chartered as arbitrary and designed as to not affect their viability in the U.S.).
174. Kahr, supra note 130; Too big to Jail,supra note 71.
175. See Devin Leary-Hanebrink, CFPB Should Stand for 'Choking Financial

2013]
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monitoring takes longer with less personnel or technology, and this will
lead to delays. Compliance departments will come to resemble an ever-

expanding bureaucracy fighting a battle of the forms in both producing
reports and responding to questions from regulators. 7 6 Finally, without

generate money
liquid assets to pay for compliance, banks will have 1to
77
for AML budgets through higher costs to consumers.
Creating a compliance system that will withstand the rigors of
OCC regulation will not be cheap or simple, especially given the size
and scope of some of the largest global banks. 178 However, the giant

banks that have the scale and resources to operate in this regulatory
environment will become the dominant foreign correspondent banking
service providers. 179 These banks enjoy the best of both worlds,
bankroll a variety of immediately effective strategies while still
pursuing long term goals like standardization, consolidation, or
integration with anti-fraud. 180 Again, these are ambitious goals given
their size and scope; but once achieved, the successful banks will have a
streamlined global system combining AML and anti-fraud, the costs of

which are potentially offset in part by the financial benefit of fraud
prevention.181 This achievement will create a positive reputation among
regulators, consumers, and investors' 82 sufficient to create a dominant
Professionals

and

Businesses',

AM.

BANKER,

July

13,

2012,

http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/CFPB-Stands-For-Choking-FinancialProfessionals-and-Businesses-1050898-1.html (presenting an analogous argument for the
effect of increased regulation in response to Dodd-Frank). The author renames the CFPB
"Choking Financial Professionals and Businesses." He highlights the decrease in consumer
checking accounts saying, "due to ever-increasing compliance requirements under DoddFrank, most banks elected to pass these costs along to the consumer by eliminating free
checking." He argues this has led many consumers to abandon checking accounts all
together.
176. Kahr, supra note 130.
177. Gordon, supra note 128.
178. HSBC's Grilling, supra note 7. Giant banks are large complex corporations and
coordination between different offices may be difficult. It could be also be difficult to get
different systems in other countries to talk to each other efficiently. However, that problem
would amplify and more severely affect second tier banks should they attempt to create a
collective AML system. Affiliates operating under the same global bank have at least that
commonality, and there are few competing interests to square as they pursue a common goal
within the corporation. In contrast, multiple banks are competitors, not teammates working
together with a single coach.
179. Id.; Katkov, supra note 5, at 10.
180. Id. at 10.
181. Id. at27.
182. Hurley & Beccia, supra note 143, at 48; Katkov, supra note 5, at 6. Consumers'
confidence is key to any business, as is investor confidence since shareholders essentially
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position in foreign correspondent banking.183
V. CONCLUSION

While AML compliance and oversight are in the best interest of
the American public and financial system, the new compliance regime
as it stands will create winners and losers. 184 Additional and stricter
regulation from the OCC necessitates that banks improve, but
inconsistent enforcement of enhanced due diligence with scant guidance
to banks has and will continue to lead to confusion for compliance
departments. 85 The winners of this increased regulatory regime are the
large banks that can afford to fund expansive AML strategies.' 86 These
banks are in the unique position to provide short-term AML protection
as they implement more effective, long-term solutions.' 87 Having lost
national and large regional banks to the cost of compliance and fear of
large sanctions, the correspondent banking market will next lose second
tier multinational banks. Atop the cliff, large global banks will assume
a dominant position and become the exclusive actors in foreign
correspondent banking.
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